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Abstract 
 
The continuous rising levels of rhino poaching in South Africa 
require smart strategies that move beyond prosecuting the 
actual poachers to engaging the transnational criminals who 
deal with the rhino horn after it leaves the country. In this regard, 
South Africa has a number of laws that deal with the poaching 
of rhino horns. The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 
1998 (POCA) does not provide for the adequate prosecution of 
offenders outside South Africa. It is argued that the POCA has 
to be amended to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction to deal 
with the prosecution of the higher echelons of those involved in 
rhino poaching. While the POCA provides for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in some respects, the application of these provisions 
still presents challenges in their implementation. To substantiate 
this claim, this article first discusses the international networks 
that support the trade in rhino horn. A critique of the available 
statistics on rhino poaching follows, as does a suggestion that 
attention must be paid to the details in the statistical records to 
understand how desperate the situation is. Thereafter, an 
evaluation of South Africa's legislative framework and other 
interlinking factors that affect rhino poaching is performed This 
demonstrates the need for extraterritorial jurisdiction with regard 
to rhino poaching.  
Keywords 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction; higher echelons; National Strategy; 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act; prosecution; rhino poaching. 
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1 Introduction 
South Africa has placed a lot of emphasis on the prosecution of rhino 
poaching, using the various strategies at its disposal. These include the use 
of preventive measures like the training of officers to detect smuggling at 
the ports of entry, the specialised training of game rangers to aid the 
execution of body/vehicle searches, arrests, and the handling of seized 
items across South Africa.1 Statistics have been compiled that indicate a 
high degree of success in the prosecution and conviction of these criminals. 
However, at the core of these statistics are disturbing details pertaining to 
the conviction rate. This is defined as the percentage of the convictions 
divided by the number of cases finalised with a verdict. As will be shown, 
the conviction rate is not a good yardstick to measure success. 
In addition, the conviction rate is not explained in the light of the 
classification of the rhino poaching syndicates. While the classification 
reflects the three stages of collection, transportation, and distribution,2 the 
reconciliation with the persons who are convicted is limited to those arrested 
and prosecuted in South Africa. These individuals are usually involved in 
the collection and transportation stages. This limitation does not adequately 
deal with the accused who are arrested outside South Africa. It is argued 
that an informed conclusion can be arrived at only after an evaluation of 
South Africa's legislation, the principles of criminal law, and other 
interlinking factors in the prosecution the higher echelons. 
1.1 Classification of organised crime networks 
Hendricke and Daffue classify the organised rhino crime network as a 
complex system that consists of three stages: collection, transportation, and 
distribution.3 At the collection stage are local gangs that include scouts, 
drivers, shooters, cutters and leaders, who go to the national parks and 
harvest the rhino horn.4 The leaders, who usually have direct links to 
Mozambique, act as the conduit to the transportation stage, where they take 
                                            
  Robert D Nanima. LLB (Makerere University, Kampala) Dip LP (Law Development 
Centre, Kampala) LLM LLD (University of the Western Cape). Postdoctoral 
Researcher, Children’s Rights Project, Dullah Omar Institute, Faculty of the 
University of the Western Cape. E-mail: rnanima@uwc.ac.za. I acknowledge the 
input by Prof Isreal Leeman, who edited the drafts, and the anonymous reviewers 
for their insightful comments. 
1  Molewa 2016 https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/molewa_highlights 
progress_onrhinopoaching2016. 
2  Hübschle Game of Horns 37. Also see Nanima 2016 Afr J Leg Stud 225.  
3  Hübschle Game of Horns 37. Also see Nanima 2016 Afr J Leg Stud 225. 
4  Hübschle Game of Horns 37; Nanima 2016 Afr J Leg Stud 225. 
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the rhino horn either to national exporters or to international receivers.5 The 
latter individuals then transfer the rhino horn to the kingpins. The kingpins 
act as the last link in the transportation chain and may have the horns 
processed for the distribution stages.6 The kingpins also act as the links 
between the transportation stage and the distribution stage. They transmit 
the horns to the first distributors, who deliver them to the second distributors. 
At this point, the horn reaches the final consumer.7 
This structure is similar to that of the criminal chain proposed by the Global 
Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (The Global Initiative).8 
Transnational organised crime includes three groups: the source, transit, 
and the destination market.9 At the source, the poachers or the collectors 
carry out the act of poaching, extraction and collection of the resources.10 
The collection stage is closely related to Hendricke and Daffue's model. The 
second stage, including transit, involves various players such as brokers 
and smugglers, who perform various acts, including bribing the relevant 
officers and smuggling, to ensure that the merchandise is taken out of the 
first jurisdiction.11 It is at this point that the national exporters and 
international receivers come in handy in ensuring that the rhino horn is 
brought to the markets, once it has been smuggled out of South Africa. The 
Global Initiative presents the final stage as the destination market, which 
engages with players such as market controllers, vendors, traditional 
medicine practitioners, wildlife restaurant owners, and consumers.12 These 
five players ensure that the poached product is ready for purchase and 
consumption. 
While Hendricke and Daffue's classification present the three stages of 
collection, transportation and distribution,13 the Global Initiative, too, 
presents the three stages of source, transit and market. As points of 
intersection, the stages of source and collection, followed by transportation 
                                            
5  Nanima 2016 Afr J Leg Stud 225. 
6  Nanima 2016 Afr J Leg Stud 225. 
7  Nanima 2016 Afr J Leg Stud 225. 
8  Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2014 http://www.global 
initiative.net/knowledge-bank/publications/. 
9  Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2014 http://www.global 
initiative.net/knowledge-bank/publications/ 20. 
10  Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2014 http://www.global 
initiative.net/knowledge-bank/publications/ 20. 
11  Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2014 http://www.global 
initiative.net/knowledge-bank/publications/ 20. 
12  Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2014 http://www.global 
initiative.net/knowledge-bank/publications/ 20. 
13  Nanima 2016 Afr J Leg Stud 225. 
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and transit, culminate in the distribution or destination market. Both these 
models present three levels in rhino horn poaching. For the purposes of this 
article, the author uses the model of Hendricke and Daffue, as illustrated 
below:14 
 
The framework of the networks (as illustrated above) aids in the argument 
that prosecution is to a major extent targeted at the players in the collection 
stage. There is inadequate prosecution of the players at the transportation 
and the distribution stages. 
1.2 Unpacking the emphasis on rhino poaching 
Before delving into the body of the article, it may be prudent to explain the 
author's emphasis on the need to prosecute rhino poaching in particular 
rather than poaching of other kinds of wildlife, or other complex 
transnational crimes with a similar organisational structure that are not yet 
adequately dealt with in legislation. 
First, the rhino is the species closest to extinction after the group of the 
pangolins, vultures, and riverine rabbits.15 Poaching has greatly affected the 
                                            
14  Hendricke & Daffue (2013) in Hübschle Game of Horns 37. 
15  Ras 2018 https://www.wildcard.co.za/endangered-species-day-insight-experts/. 
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black rhino population, followed by the white rhino.16 An attempt to extend 
the emphasis of this article to other endangered species that are affected 
by poaching would affect the quality of the evaluation and compromise the 
arguments made in this contribution. Secondly, other kinds of transnational 
organised crime present similar organisational structures,17 yet the gaps in 
the current legislation affect effective prosecution.18 Notable examples 
include human trafficking, terrorism and related offences, corruption, the 
smuggling of persons, dealing in drugs, dealing in arms, and illicit trading. 
The point of departure is that there are international or regional treaties that 
are specific to the prosecution of these crimes as international crimes.19 The 
possibility of using universal jurisdiction to prosecute them makes the 
prosecution easier.20 As will be shown, the lack of interlinking factors such 
as the codification of the aut dedere aut judicare principle in South Africa's 
laws, the lack of universal jurisdiction to prosecute rhino poaching, and the 
lack of specific extradition treaties are factors that support the argument 
made here.21 
1.3  An evaluation of the National Integrated Strategy to Combat 
Wildlife Trafficking 
The DEA has adopted a National Integrated Strategy to Combat Wildlife 
Trafficking (NISCWT).22 The NISCWT defines poaching to include the 
activity of the illegal capturing or hunting of wildlife, with the intention of 
possession, transportation, consumption, exportation or the selling and use 
of its body parts.23 Poachers are defined as individuals or a group of 
                                            
16  Slabbert 2018 https://www.rnews.co.za/article/15604/the-10-most-endangered-
animals-in-south-africa. 
17  For abalone poaching, see the structure in De Greef Booming Illegal Abalone 
Fishery 56. For a general overview on the general structure from the poachers or 
harvesters, through middlemen, to wholesalers, exporters, processors and retailers, 
see generally Global Financial Integrity Transnational Crime in the Developing 
World, Liddick Crimes against Nature generally, and Van Uhm 2012 CIROC 
Newsletter 4. 
18  See the discussion of the evaluation of the current legislative scope under section 3 
below. 
19  The UNODC has provided for universal jurisdiction for its offences under any of these 
treaties: the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
(2000), the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children (2000) and the Protocol against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and 
Ammunition (2001). See section 3 on an evaluation of the current legislation. 
20  Such cases include terrorism, torture and theft. See Mujuzi 2015 AYIHL generally. 
21  See section 3.2 on an evaluation of the modes of criminal liability and the use of the 
aut dedere aut judicare in prosecution. 
22  RSA 2017 http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/170530 
NISCWT.pdf (hereafter the NISCWT 2017). 
23  NISCWT 2017 9. 
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individuals involved in the collection, transportation, consumption, 
exportation and the sale of the body parts. These two definitions recognise 
the categorisation of the stages in rhino poaching,24 and the trafficking 
syndicates as key players in rhino poaching in South Africa. 25 The efficacy 
of the NISCWT should be with regard to the measures that should be used 
to deal with individuals who are involved in the transportation, consumption, 
exportation and sale of the rhino horn outside South Africa. This is because 
the current legislative framework deals to a great extent with the poachers 
at the collection stage in South Africa, who are usually arrested and 
prosecuted.26 
In this regard, the NISCWT is guided by three objectives: 
[To improve] law enforcement, supported by the whole of government and 
society, to effectively investigate, prosecute and adjudicate wildlife trafficking 
as a form of transnational organised crime. 
[To increase] the government's ability to detect, prevent and combat wildlife 
trafficking in South Africa and beyond. 
[To increase] national, regional and international law enforcement 
collaboration and cooperation on combating wildlife trafficking.27 
An adequate evaluation of all these three objectives of the NISCWT is 
beyond the scope of this article. This article evaluates specific aspects of 
the NISCWT with regard to how higher echelons, as part of the wider 
definition of poachers, can be effectively prosecuted in South Africa. The 
second objective that requires the Republic to detect, prevent and combat 
wildlife trafficking within and beyond South Africa is evaluated. 
The second objective emphasises the need to ensure that ports of entry are 
not used for wildlife trafficking.28 The government is expected to detect, 
prevent and combat wildlife trafficking within and beyond the Republic, 
reduce corruption, increase its resources to improve security at the border 
points, and enhance crime preventive strategies around poaching 
hotspots.29 These obligations are not enforced beyond South Africa's 
borders because of the lack of extraterritorial jurisdiction and mutual 
cooperation with other States.30 The key question is how the government 
                                            
24  NISCWT 2017 9. 
25  NISCWT 2017 10. 
26  See section 1.1 above. 
27  NISCWT 2017 20. 
28  NISCWT 2017 26-28. 
29  NISCWT 2017 26-28. 
30  NISCWT 2017 29, 57. This success extends to the third objective. 
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can perform the three obligations outside South Africa. The answers are in 
the interrogation of the current statistics on poaching, the legislative 
provisions, the modes of criminal liability, and the doctrine of aut dedere aut 
judicare with regard to the prosecution of higher echelons. 
2 Current statistics: a danger in the detail? 
The reported statistics are not uniform, which requires that they be 
approached with caution. The official statistics published by the Department 
of Environmental Affairs show a significant increase in the number of 
poachers arrested in 2016 and a decline in rhino poaching to 24 per cent.31 
This is based on the arrest of 414 poachers in South Africa, in contrast to 
the 557 arrests in 2015. The Government reiterates that it has undertaken 
preventive measures which include the training of officers to detect 
smuggling at the ports of entry, and the specialised training of over 1000 
game rangers to aid the execution of body and vehicle searches, arrests, 
and the handling of seized items across South Africa.32 
On the other hand, other scholars who follow rhino poaching closely offer a 
different interpretation.33 It is reported that 1028 rhinos were poached from 
January to December 2017, which reflects a minimal decline of 2.4 per cent 
in comparison to the 1002 rhinos poached in 2016.34 The statistics are 
different because of the different definition accorded to the "conviction rate" 
by the NPA. It is defined as the percentage of cases with a guilty verdict 
divided by the number of cases finalised with a verdict.35 This definition does 
not include cases that are not brought to court for prosecution or where 
arrests made but without consequent prosecution. Such a definition leads 
to different statistics depending on whether the percentage of cases with a 
guilty verdict is related to cases with a verdict or cases where arrests have 
been effected. 
Something is evident in the statistics that adds value to this study. The 
persons who are arrested during the collection stage are those individuals 
who do the actual poaching, such as the 414 poachers who were arrested 
                                            
31  Molewa 2016 https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/molewa_ 
highlightsprogress_onrhinopoaching2016. 
32  Molewa 2016 https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/molewa_ 
highlightsprogress_onrhinopoaching2016. 
33  Verwoerd 2016 https://conservationaction.co.za/media-articles/south-africa-
conviction-rate-pitiful-rhino-crimes/. 
34  Verwoerd 2016 https://conservationaction.co.za/media-articles/south-africa-
conviction-rate-pitiful-rhino-crimes/. 
35  Verwoerd 2016 https://conservationaction.co.za/media-articles/south-africa-
conviction-rate-pitiful-rhino-crimes/. 
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in South Africa. There is little reference to arrests outside South Africa of 
other players, like international receivers, kingpins and distributors in other 
jurisdictions like Mozambique and the far east. The references to the 
preventive measures taken, such as the detection and prevention of the 
movement of rhino horn beyond South Africa's major ports of entry, are to 
those effected inside rather than outside the Republic.36 The statistics are 
silent on the legal countermeasures to deal with the detection, arrest and 
prosecution of individuals engaged in the transportation and distribution of 
the rhino horn.  
Other government organs that are engaged in the prosecution of the 
persons involved in rhino poaching include the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) and the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions (NDPP). A look 
at the NDPP Annual Report for 2016 indicates that there was a high 
conviction rate of 88.9% (359 convictions as at 31 May 2016).37 While this 
resonates with the conviction rate of 88.8% alluded to by the DEA, a 
contradiction is evident where the NDPP Annual Report for 2016 shows that 
the 46 convictions for the year involved 15 Mozambiqans. However, if this 
contradiction is to be tested against the results for a different year, perhaps 
for 2015, for instance, one finds disturbing detail in the rhino poaching 
statistics. The killing of 1175 rhinos that led to 317 arrests resulted in the 
conviction of only 48 accused out of the 54 (17 per cent of the arrests) who 
were prosecuted. 38 It is absurd to conclude on the basis of the prosecution 
of 17 per cent of the arrested persons that there is a conviction rate of 88 
per cent. This mode of calculation of the conviction rates does not offer a 
useful approach to dealing with all the challenges in rhino poaching. 
These contradictory reports are silent regarding any successes beyond the 
borders of South Africa with regard to transportation and distribution. The 
need for caution has to be emphasised. 
3 An evaluation of the current legislative framework 
This section looks at the legislative framework before the enactment of the 
POCA, the position of the POCA in the light of other principles of criminal 
law, and other interlinking factors. 
                                            
36  Molewa 2016 https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/molewa_highlights 
progress_onrhinopoaching2016. 
37  NDPP 2016 https://www.npa.gov.za/sites/default/files/annual-reports/NPA% 
20Annual%20Report%201516.pdf. 
38  DEA 2016 https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/rhino_ 
matters_april2015_march2016.pdf. 
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3.1 Legislative framework  
A look at other laws that deal with environmental crimes is instructive in 
presenting a contextual background that justifies the argument that the 
provisions of the POCA should be amended. 
3.1.1 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998  
The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) deals 
with issues of corporate governance, integrated environmental 
management, and issues of international obligations and duties.39 
Furthermore, the NEMA provides a framework within which to carry out 
activities that are sanctioned by the Minister and accords powers to the 
latter to create offences for the contravention of the Act.40  
With regard to offences, it prohibits individuals from engaging in listed 
activities without the permission of the Minister.41 Particular regard is placed 
on section 25, which creates guidance on the creation of offences. The 
relevant provision provides that: 
The Minister may introduce legislation in Parliament or make such regulations 
as may be necessary for giving effect to an international environmental 
instrument to which the Republic is a party, and such legislation and 
regulations may deal with inter alia the following- 
…implementation of and compliance with the provisions of the instrument, 
including the creation of offences and the prescription of penalties where 
applicable;…42 
This subsection requires the enactment of legislation for the implementation 
of and compliance with an international instrument and criminalises 
prohibited conduct. There is no guidance on how to deal with cases 
involving suspects who are beyond South Africa's borders.43 It is correct to 
state that the NEMA fails to address issues of organised crime, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and wildlife crimes with regard to higher echelons 
outside the jurisdiction of South Africa.  
On a positive note, it is worth noting that some provinces in the Republic 
have enacted legislation that can be used to prosecute the various players 
                                            
39  The long title to the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (hereafter 
NEMA). 
40  Section 24 of NEMA. 
41  Sections 25(3)(g), 34G(1), 44(3) and 49A of NEMA. 
42  Section 25(3)(g) of NEMA. 
43  The NEMA does not engage with the prosecution of those who deal in rhino horn 
after it has been poached. 
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in rhino horn poaching. For instance, Limpopo Province enacted the 
Limpopo Environmental Management Act (LEMA),44 which consolidates 
and amends the environmental management legislation and incidental 
matters in Limpopo Province.45 The LEMA has been put to the test and 
applied in a number of cases.46  
3.1.2 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004  
The National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 
(NEMBA) provides a statutory framework for the management and 
conservation of the Republic's biodiversity as dealt with in the NEMA. 47 
Against this background, the NEMBA offers two plausible steps with regard 
to the prosecution of rhino poachers. First, it restricts dealings in 
endangered species. 48 Secondly, it empowers the Minister to prepare a list 
of endangered species.49 Just like the NEMA, the NEMBA does not deal 
with incidents that occur outside the borders of the Republic.50 However, the 
NEMBA still fails to address issues of the prosecution of persons who are 
higher echelons involved in organised crime, and/or in extraterritorial 
spaces. An example of this shortfall is illustrated below: 
A person may not carry out a restricted activity involving a specimen of a listed 
protected species without a permit issued in terms of Chapter 7.51 
The wording of the section indicates a criminalisation of particular activities 
within South Africa's borders. It fails to capture instances where the person 
involved in the poaching is outside the borders of the Republic. The lack of 
guidance on extraterritorial jurisdiction with regard to the prosecution of 
higher echelons is a great limitation in the fight against rhino poaching. 
Closely linked to the NEMA and the NEMBA is the National Environmental 
                                            
44  The Limpopo Environmental Management Act 7 of 2003 (hereafter LEMA). 
45  Long title. s 31(1)(a) of the LEMA prohibits the unlawful, wrongful and intentional 
hunting of a specially protected wild animal without a valid permit, while ss 41(1)(a), 
1 and 17(1)(a)(i) deals with the unlawful purchasing, possessing and conveying of a 
specially protected wild animal without a valid permit. 
46  Els v S 2017 2 SACR 622 (SCA) paras 17-21. Also see S v Lemthongthai 2015 1 
SACR 353 (SCA) generally. 
47  Long title to the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 
(hereafter NEMBA). 
48  Sections 57(1), (2) and (3), and 87(a)(i) of NEMBA. 
49  Sections 56(1)(a) (d) of NEMBA. 
50  See cases that show that the prosecution in the application of the NEMBA was 
confined to activities within the Republic: Mkhabela v S 2016 ZAGPPHC 936 (8 
November 2016) para 4; Kruger v Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs 2016 
1 All SA 565 (GP) paras 3, 10 and 11. 
51  Section 57(1) of NEMBA 
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Management: Protected Areas Act (NEMAPAA),52 which provides for the 
management and governance of protected areas and their usage.53 The key 
consolidating feature lies in the emphasis on poaching within South Africa's 
borders. 
3.1.3 Criminal Procedure Act 55 of 1977 
The Criminal Procedure Act has safeguards that ensure the effective 
prosecution of serious offences that are listed in schedule 5. The Director 
of Public Prosecutions (DPP) has to consent to the prosecution of these 
offences, and exceptional circumstances have to be proved by an accused 
before he or she is granted bail. The list of serious offences includes rape, 
murder, particular kinds of organised crime such as trafficking by 
commercial careers, drug trafficking, and the smuggling of ammunition. 
However, dealing in endangered species such as poaching is not 
recognised as among the schedule 5 offences.54 This is an indication that 
the safeguards accorded to serious crimes do not extend to dealing in 
endangered species or the offences under the POCA. In addition, the 
safeguards under the Criminal Procedure Act ensure that there is a 
streamlined process that governs the institution, process and final 
determination of offences, where the accused is in South Africa. There is no 
reference to bringing the higher echelons to South Africa or any other 
foreign court for trial in instances of rhino poaching in the Republic. While 
the implications of listing the offence of dealing in endangered species as a 
schedule 5 offence aid effective prosecution, a higher echelon from another 
jurisdiction cannot be subjected to these safeguards. 
3.1.4 International Cooperation in Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996  
The International Cooperation in Criminal Matters Act (ICCMA) deals with 
facilitating the provision of evidence, the execution of sentences in criminal 
matters, and the confiscations and transfer of the proceeds of crime 
between South Africa and foreign States.55 Its objectives are: 
                                            
52  National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 57 of 2003 (hereafter 
NEMAPAA). 
53  The objects clause in s 2 of NEMAPAA. Also see Mkhabela v S 2016 ZAGPPHC 
936 (8 November 2016) para 4. 
54  Sections 58, 60(11) and (11A), and Schedule 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act 55 of 
1977. 
55  International Cooperation in Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996 (hereafter ICCMA). For 
an engagement with this Act and issues of evidence see Mujuzi 2015 De Jure 351-
387. Also see Watney 2012 PELJ 294. 
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To facilitate the provision of evidence and the execution of sentences in 
criminal cases and the confiscation and transfer of the proceeds of crime 
between the Republic and foreign States, and to provide for matters 
connected therewith.56 
The cumulative effect of the scope of the ICCMA does not go beyond the 
three aspects of the provision of evidence, the execution of sentences and 
the transfer of the proceeds of crime. This is an indication that instances of 
the commission or aiding and abetting of a crime by an individual who is 
outside the Republic cannot be prosecuted with the aid of the ICCMA.57 
In addition, this Act deals with the procedures related to the admission of 
evidence, and with other subsequent court matters. It should be stated that 
it offers support in instances where rhino poaching has occurred at the three 
levels and the evidence that needs to be used has to be obtained from 
outside of the jurisdiction. The shortcoming of the ICCMA lies in its failure 
to deal with an offence that starts in the Republic and continues beyond 
South Africa's borders. The advantage that the ICCMA provides is its ability 
to ensure that orders made by foreign states in the course of criminal 
prosecution may be registered and enforced in South Africa.58 As such, it is 
argued that the ICCMA then may aid only the admission of evidence from 
outside the Republic and the enforcement of foreign judgments where the 
culprits have been prosecuted and convicted abroad.59 It is at this point that 
a law that offers extraterritorial jurisdiction may come in handy.60  
It is worth noting that the POCA amends the ICCMA by providing new 
definitions of a confiscation order and a restraint order.61 In addition, the 
POCA repealed the Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996.62 Before the repeal 
was effected, the Proceeds of Crime Act was limited to the recovery of the 
proceeds of crime and the prohibition of money laundering63 through the 
                                            
56  The long title to the ICCMA. 
57  See the discussion on common purpose below. 
58  Falk v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 1 SACR 265 (CC) paras 2-3. 
59  The structure of the ICCMA covers instances of definitions (s 1), the mutual provision 
of evidence (ss 2-12), the mutual execution of sentences and compulsory orders (ss 
13-18), the confiscation and transfer of the proceeds of crime (ss 19-26), and other 
miscellaneous matters (ss 27-37). The plausible prosecution under the Act is with 
regard to witnesses who fail to adhere to subpoena within the meaning of s 10 of the 
ICCMA.  
60  The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (hereafter POCA) provides for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. It is not adequate to deal with the prosecution of echelons 
of the rhino horn poaching syndicates as articulated below, however. 
61  Section 79(a) and Schedule 2 of POCA. The amendments are introduced in the 
ICCMA in ss 1(a)-(b). This amendment does speak to the actual prosecution of 
persons involved in organised crime, who are outside the Republic. 
62  The long title to, and s 79(c) of POCA. 
63  The long title, ch 5 and ss 28-33 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996. 
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provision of confiscation orders64 and restraint orders,65 and the realisation 
of property.66 The effect of the amendments introduced by the POCA 
extended the initial application of the Proceeds of Crime Act by providing for 
offences relating to organised crime, racketeering activities, the proceeds of 
unlawful activities, and criminal gang activities.67 Usually, the poaching of 
rhinos is an organised crime that includes various players, right from the 
collection stage, through the transportation stage, to the distribution stage.68 
As such, while the amendments by the POCA aid its effectiveness in the 
prosecution of wildlife crimes, they still offer no concrete guidance on how 
to deal with the prosecution of higher echelons.  
3.1.5 South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995  
The South Africa Police Service Act (SAPSA)69 has a list of activities that 
indicate the recognition of organised crime. It states that the recognition as 
such of activities 
by a person, group of persons or syndicate acting in – 
(i)  an organised fashion; or 
(ii)  a manner which could result in substantial financial gain for the person, 
group of persons or syndicate involved70 
in respect of the hunting, importation, exportation, possession, buying and 
selling of endangered species or any products thereof as may be prescribed;71 
in more than one province or outside the borders of the Republic by the same 
perpetrator or perpetrators, and in respect of which the prevention or 
investigation at national level would be in the national interest.72 
The above circumstances acknowledge that organised crime networks have 
an existing organised structure that functions for financial benefit. In 
addition, the benefits in this context result from dealing with endangered 
species, and there is a need for transnational cooperation in conducting 
investigations. In addition, the SAPSA elaborates on the notion of an 
"organised fashion" as the ongoing, continuous or repeated participation in 
                                            
64  Chapter 2 and ss 8-14 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996. 
65  Chapter 3 and ss 15-19 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996. 
66  Chapter 4 and ss 2027 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996. 
67  Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of POCA. 
68  See the discussion in the introduction above. 
69  The South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. 
70  Section 16(1)(a) of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. 
71  Section 16(1)(e) of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. 
72  Sections 16(1)(a), (e), (f) of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. 
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at least two incidents of criminal activity.73 It would appear that this 
qualification is for the purpose of qualifying a crime as organised crime 
rather than for the purpose of the prosecution of the culprits. 
A comparison of the list in the SAPSA with the definition of a criminal gang 
in the POCA indicates that this organised structure may be either informal 
or formal. Secondly, the members engage individually or collectively in 
criminal activities. The point of contention is the existence of either a name 
or an identifying symbol. While the SAPSA provides this definition, it does 
not criminalise the activities that would form organised crime, requiring 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. This informs the decision to evaluate the POCA 
as the law that deals with organised crime. 
3.1.6 Extradition Act 67 of 2002 
In addition, the Extradition Act allows for ad hoc arrangements in the 
absence of an extradition agreement, where there is a request for the 
surrender of a person.74 The purpose of extradition is to ensure that persons 
who have committed a crime in country A and are within the jurisdiction of 
country B may, upon a request by A, be moved from country B to country A 
to be prosecuted. The author is not aware of any extradition agreements 
between South Africa and the Asian States of Vietnam or China. This poses 
great challenges with regard to the prosecution of the higher echelons of 
those involved in rhino poaching. Nonetheless, an examination of the 
position with regard to extradition in the three countries is instructive in 
placing the study in context. There is a need to establish whether an ad hoc 
arrangement is an international agreement. 
The South African Constitution allows the President of South Africa to enter 
into international agreements on behalf of the Republic,75 such as 
extradition agreements.76 The international agreements, however, have to 
be domesticated through an approval by resolution of the National Council 
of Provinces and the National Assembly.77 The failure to obtain this approval 
renders any application of the agreement void.  
                                            
73  Section 16(1)(a) of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. 
74  Section 3(2) of the South African Extradition Act 67 of 2002. Also see Moti v 
President of the Republic of South Africa 2017 ZAGPPHC 501 (18 August 2017) 
(hereafter Moti) para 14. 
75  Section 231 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
76  Katz 2003 SACJ 319. 
77  President of the Republic of South Africa v Quagliani; President of the Republic of 
South Africa v Van Rooyen; Goodwin v Director-General, Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2009 8 BCLR 785 (CC) para 42; Botha 2009 SAYIL 262. 
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Before the question of whether an ad hoc arrangement is an international 
agreement is answered, it should be noted that there are international law 
principles that may be used to ensure the prosecution of a citizen of one 
State in another. One of these principles is comity, which is described as: 
… a set of reciprocal norms among nations that call for one state to recognise, 
and sometimes defer to, the laws, judgments, or interests of another. Comity 
is a regime of intergovernmental courtesy.78 
Flowing from this definition, it is envisioned that South Africa, Mozambique, 
and Far East countries such as Vietnam recognise the interests that each 
country has with regard to rhino poaching. The concluded Memorandums 
of Understanding with some States such as Vietnam lack the required 
guidance with regard to the prosecution of persons outside South Africa's 
borders.79  
As earlier stated, the ad hoc arrangements in the absence of an extradition 
agreement may be used where there is a request for the surrender of a 
person.80 While the process is subject to the same rules that apply to an 
extradition treaty, it is required that the President considers the request for 
the surrender and offers his written consent.81 This occurred in Harksen v 
President of the Republic of South Africa, where in the absence of an 
extradition agreement the President consented to the extradition of 
Harksen, a German national, to Germany to face trial.82 In the Harksen case 
the Constitutional Court stated that the ad hoc arrangement by South Africa 
to extradite Harksen to Germany was not unconstitutional as far as it was 
not an international agreement that required ratification by Parliament.83 It 
should be stated that while the President may conclude ad hoc extradition 
treaties, these remain to be domestic engagements that do not require 
parliamentary approval. This position solves the silence of the Constitution 
on domestication, and indicates that ad hoc agreements are domestic 
engagements rather than international agreements. 
                                            
For a general engagement with the issues on extradition law in South Africa, see 
Hartnick South Africa's Human Rights Centred Approach to Extradition generally. 
78  Seinfeld 2015 Notre Dame L Rev 1309.  
79  See the discussion of some of the MoUs under section 4 below. 
80  Section 3(2) of the South African Extradition Act 67 of 2002. See also Moti v 
President of the Republic of South Africa 2017 ZAGPPHC 501 (18 August 2017) 
para 14. 
81  Moti para 14. 
82  Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 825 (CC) (hereafter 
Harksen). 
83  Harksen paras 24 and 28. 
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It is prudent to examine the use of ad hoc agreements where associated 
States are involved. According to the Extradition Act, four principles govern 
engagements with associated States. First, there should be an existing 
extradition agreement that provides for the endorsement for execution of 
warrants of arrest on a reciprocal basis.84 Secondly, a magistrate in the 
associated State before whom a warrant is issued for the arrest of any 
person to be surrendered to the associated State is required to endorse the 
warrant for execution.85 Thirdly, the warrant is endorsed regardless of the 
whereabouts or suspected whereabouts of the person to be arrested.86 
Fourthly, the Magistrate has to be satisfied that the warrant was lawfully 
issued.87  
These principles should be reflected in the laws of extradition of the 
associated States. If this is asserted in the affirmative, then the first 
requirement of a subsisting extradition agreement is solved. Although the 
author is not aware of any subsisting agreement between South Africa and 
Mozambique,88 it is argued that this lack is solved by the application of the 
Extradition Act to ad hoc arrangements.89 The reading of sections 6, 5 and 
11(b) points to a person to be extradited to South Africa, other than from 
associated States to the Republic. The application of the remaining 
principles requires that there should be similar provisions in the extradition 
laws of associated States and the willingness to enforce them.90 The current 
law of extradition in Mozambique lacks similar provisions.91 
3.1.7 CITES and UN Resolutions  
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES) offers international resolutions that require a legal 
framework that embraces the prosecution of organised crime. The 
importance of these resolutions lies in the call for States Parties to embrace 
international cooperation with regard to illicit trafficking in wildlife and 
corruption. States Parties to CITES recognise that corruption plays a 
                                            
84  Section 6 of the Extradition Act 67 of 2002. 
85  Section 6 of the Extradition Act 67 of 2002. 
86  Section 6 of the Extradition Act 67 of 2002. 
87  Section 6 of the Extradition Act 67 of 2002. 
88  DOJ & CD 2019 http://www.justice.gov.za/ilr/mla.html. 
89  Section 3(2) of the Extradition Act 67 of 2002. See also Moti para 14. 
90  This reciprocity depends on the commitment of the Executive in the associated State 
to ensure the arrest and surrender of the person to South Africa's authorities. 
91  Republic of Mozambique 2011 https://dre.pt/pesquisa/-/search/ 
287075/details/maximized. 
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significant role in facilitating wildlife crime92 with the close involvement of 
organised crime groups.93 It is on this basis that the States Parties stress 
the need to undertake measures that ensure the effective implementation 
of the Convention,94 through administration, regulation, implementation or 
enforcement through the use of adequate penalties under domestic 
legislation.95  
This resolution notes that the three main chains in illicit wildlife trafficking 
involve the source, transit and market countries, which are facilitated by 
corruption at all these levels. An emphasis on dealing with corruption is not 
an end in itself as far as there are other aspects that contribute to the 
continued trafficking of wildlife like the lack of a law that adequately deals 
with extraterritorial jurisdiction. Despite this position, it is worth noting that 
the resolution encourages the use of national enforcement agencies that 
have a cross-border effect like the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC).96 The weight is still on the State Party to embrace such 
initiatives and convert them into an enabling law that leads to the 
prosecution of the higher echelons. 
A recent UN resolution on tackling illicit trafficking in wildlife calls on the 
Member States to take decisive steps at the national level to prevent, 
combat and eradicate illegal trade from both the supply and demand sides.97 
This requires the recognition that while the supply might be from the 
Republic, the demand is beyond its borders. This creates complications with 
regard to the prosecution of the perpetrators at the source of the supply and 
at the end of the demand chain. It is on this basis that the resolution calls 
for the strengthening of legislation that deals with the prevention, 
investigation, prosecution of perpetrators and the increased sharing of 
                                            
92  CITES 2017 https://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/document/E-Res-17-06.pdf 
preambular para 1.  
93  CITES 2017 https://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/document/E-Res-17-06.pdf 
preambular para 2. 
94  CITES 2017 https://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/document/E-Res-17-06.pdf 
para 1. 
95  CITES 2017 https://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/document/E-Res-17-06.pdf 
para 2. 
96  CITES 2017 https://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/document/E-Res-17-06.pdf 
para 6. The importance of these two entities cannot be understated. They are 
recognised by the UN in United Nations Resolution on Tackling Illicit Trafficking in 
Wildlife GA Res A/RES/69/314 (2015) adopted on 19 August 2015 at the 69th 
session, Agenda item 13, Preambular para 6, at 2. 
97  United Nations Draft Resolution: Tackling Illicit Trafficking in Wildlife UN Doc 
A/71/L.88 (2017) presented on 5 September 2017 at the 71th session, agenda item 
13, para 4. 
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information and knowledge among national and international authorities.98 
This resolution fails, however, to tackle the challenge that wildlife-related 
offences are largely transnational crimes that require cooperation from 
various State Parties to bring the higher echelons to justice. 
3.2 An evaluation of the POCA 
A good criminal law should clearly identify the prohibited conduct and 
describe the punishment for it. This is based on the principles of nullum 
crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege.99 Against this background, 
where a law fails to prescribe the prohibited conduct, it becomes a challenge 
to punish those who commit it.100 The failure by a law to deal with such 
conduct is a challenge, especially where it is the result of jurisdictional 
challenges. These challenges include the situation where an individual in 
another jurisdiction aids and abets the commission of an offence by an 
individual in the local jurisdiction, such as the Republic of South Africa. This 
presents procedural problems, such as drafting the charges, which are 
expected to indicate the place and time where the offence was committed. 
This situation is exacerbated where it is necessary to prosecute an 
individual who was outside South Africa's geographical borders at the time 
of the commission of the offence. 
3.2.1 Challenges to the application of the POCA 
The POCA was enacted at a time when the various criminal laws that deal 
with recovery and forfeiture were inadequate to effectively deal with 
organised crime, money laundering and the activities of criminal gangs.101 
Thus, while the POCA set out to provide a statutory framework to deal with 
this loophole, it is yet to be seen how it adequately deals with organised 
crime. The POCA presents two challenges in its application. First, it is used 
to aid the addition of charges where transnational organised crime is 
                                            
98  United Nations Draft Resolution: Tackling Illicit Trafficking in Wildlife UN Doc 
A/71/L.88 (2017) presented on 5 September 2017 at the 71th session, agenda item 
13, para 4. Pursuant to this is the recognition that illicit wildlife trafficking is 
transnational in nature, involves organised groups, and requires effective 
international cooperation to combat it. 
99  Nanima 2017 Stat LR 227; Morktar 2005 Stat LR 47; Ashworth Principles of Criminal 
Law 71. 
100  While there are exceptions to the principle, such as traffic offences, the courts have 
been keen to strike them down.  
101  Preambular para 8 of POCA; also see the long title. 
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involved. For instance, where one is charged with fraud102 and forgery;103 
counts of money laundering may be placed as additional charges.104 
The drawback in implementing this approach lies in the way organised crime 
works: 
…it is usually very difficult to prove the direct involvement of organised crime 
leaders in particular cases, because they do not perform the actual criminal 
activities themselves, it is necessary to criminalise the management of. and 
related conduct in connection with enterprises which are involved in a pattern 
of racketeering activity:105 
While this recognition is instructive, the success of the POCA depends on 
how it deals with the higher echelons of those involved in rhino poaching 
who are beyond the borders of the Republic. 
The reasons for enacting the POCA, therefore, resonated with the need to 
reduce organised crime by creating a framework that would ensure that the 
proceeds of such crime would be dealt with.106 The drafting group of the 
Prevention of Organised Crime Bill indicated that South Africa's laws before 
1998 emphasised the arrest of users, sellers, and key leaders of organised 
crime.107 Drawing on trends in the United States, the drafting group 
suggested that repo-legislation be introduced to ensure that the proceeds 
of organised crime be forfeited.108 This position formed the basis of the 
enactment of the POCA and limited its application to the proceeds of crime, 
without engaging the prosecution of those involved in organised crime, such 
as rhino poaching.109 
On the foregoing basis, it is in order to argue that the POCA is used by the 
prosecution as a tool to include other charges, especially where 
transnational organised crime is involved. The effectiveness of the POCA in 
dealing with rhino poaching as a form of transnational organised crime has 
to be evaluated against the offences that it provides, and their effectiveness 
                                            
102  Contrary to s 51(2)(a) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, s 59(1)(d) 
of the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991. 
103  Contrary to s 51(2)(a) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
104  Contrary to ss 1 and 8 of POCA. These charges were used in S v Meyer 2017 
ZAGPJHC 286 (4 August 2017). See similar charges in S v Van Der Linde 2016 2 
SACR 377 (GJ). 
105  Preambular para 9 and the long title of POCA. 
106  The Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996. See NDPP 2016 
https://www.npa.gov.za/sites/default/files/annual-
reports/NPA%20Annual%20Report%201516.pdf 16. 
107  Gustrow 1998 https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/6000/. 
108  Gustrow 1998 https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/6000/. 
109  See the discussion from notes 38-79. 
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in dealing with offences related to rhino poaching. The POCA deals with 
three kinds of offences: offences related to racketeering,110 the proceeds of 
unlawful activities,111 and criminal gang activities.112 The main question that 
follows from the framework of the POCA is whether rhino poaching falls 
under one of these categories. As noted earlier, rhino poaching involves the 
collection, transportation and distribution of rhino horn. It follows that the law 
that regulates organised crime is expected to deal with these three activities, 
regardless of their geographical location.113  
Before undertaking a discussion of the three activities, it should be noted 
that the POCA does not define organised crime. A look at its drafting history 
reveals that this is by design, as the drafting group indicated that since there 
was no universal definition of organised crime, it would be difficult for South 
Africa to have one.114 The closest definition of organised crime relates to a 
criminal gang. The POCA states that a criminal gang includes 
… any formal or informal ongoing organisation, association. or group of three 
or more persons, which has as one of its activities the commission of one or 
more criminal offences, which has an identifiable name or identifying sign or 
symbol. and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have 
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.115 
This definition stipulates the four ingredients that inform the existence of a 
criminal gang: a formal or informal organisation, involved in the commission 
of offences, with an identifiable name or symbol, and whose members are 
either individually or collectively involved in the criminal activities.  
While the POCA provides for offences related to racketeering.116 It does not 
define the concept. In the first schedule to the POCA117 it describes the 
pattern of racketeering activity as the planned, on-going, continuous or 
repeated participation in an offence. The first schedule provides for dealing 
in or being in possession of or conveying endangered game in contravention 
of a statute or provincial legislation.118 In addition, the POCA criminalises 
                                            
110  Chapter 2, ss 2-3 of POCA. 
111  Chapter 3, ss 4-3, and ch 5, ss 12 62 of POCA. 
112  Chapter 4, ss 9-11 of POCA. 
113 Insights on extraterritorial jurisdiction can be obtained from the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (long title, ss 35(1), (2) and (3) 
thereof). Also see ss 6(1) and 2 of the Prevention of Combating and Torture of 
Persons Act 13 of 2013. 
114  Gustrow 1998 https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/6000/. 
115  Section 1(i)(iv) of POCA. 
116  Chapter 2 of POCA. 
117  Section 2 of POCA. 
118  Schedule 1, item 25 of POCA. 
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the engagement in racketeering activities within and outside South Africa.119 
It would be expected that the provisions in the first schedule to the POCA 
and the provision of extraterritorial jurisdiction for racketeering activities 
would place rhino poaching within the bounds of the Act. The offences 
related to racketeering are not complete unless the person receiving the 
property uses it to advance illegal activities.120 It would appear that a once-
off criminal activity that does not involve the use of its proceeds to further 
illegal activities is not an offence. It follows that extraterritorial jurisdiction for 
racketeering activities does not include jurisdiction over rhino poaching 
unless it has realised proceeds that may be intercepted by the operation of 
the POCA. Some of the instances of racketeering activity that may be 
ongoing or continuous include running Ponzi schemes121 or engaging in 
various criminal activities in an organised manner.122 
The POCA provides for a mode of dealing with the proceeds of unlawful 
activities as defined in section 1.123 The offences include money 
laundering,124 aiding an individual to benefit from the proceeds of illegal 
activities,125 the acquisition, possession and use of the proceeds of unlawful 
activities,126 and the failure to report suspicions regarding the proceeds of 
unlawful activities.127 Just like racketeering, the POCA provides under 
chapter 3 for extraterritorial jurisdiction to assist the prosecution. It is also 
intent on dealing with the proceeds of illegal activities, other than the illegal 
activities themselves. This in effect defeats the purpose of reducing the 
incidence of rhino poaching, if the law requires that there should be 
proceeds of illegal activities as a condition that precedes prosecution. 
With regard to criminal gang activities,128 the POCA offers clarity on what 
they entail. These include the illegal actions or omissions by members of 
the gang on third parties, by means of actual violence or threats.129 In 
addition, the continued existence of the gang should be evident from its 
criminal activities or the conscription of persons to join it.130 While a literal 
interpretation shows that the section seeks to deal with the existence of the 
                                            
119  Section 2(1) of POCA. 
120  Sections 2(1)(a)(i)-(iii) of POCA. 
121  Prinsloo v S 2016 1 All SA 390 (SCA). 
122  S v De Vries 2008 1 SACR 580 (C). 
123  Chapter 3 of POCA. 
124  Section 4 of POCA. 
125  Section 5 of POCA; S v De Vries 2008 1 SACR 580 (C). 
126  Section 6 of POCA. 
127  Section 7 of POCA. 
128  Chapter 4 of POCA. 
129  Section 9(1)(a)-(c) of POCA. 
130  Section 9(2)(a)-(c) of POCA. 
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gang, it does not mean that the other activities of the gang, like rhino 
poaching, are not dealt with. An individual's participation in the activities of 
a gang is an offence under the POCA.  
In the interim, the POCA has the following shortcomings. First, the offences 
of racketeering activities and the proceeds of unlawful activities as defined 
in s 1 pertain to the benefits that accrue from illegal activities and their use 
to advance illegal activities. This is an indication that unless the State proves 
to the court that a higher echelon involved at the transportation or 
distribution levels uses proceeds to enable the criminal gangs in the 
collection level to acquire more rhino horn, he or she may not be prosecuted 
under the POCA. Secondly, the extraterritorial jurisdiction for offences in the 
two categories is with regard to the proceeds obtained, and how appropriate 
orders may be applied to deal with them.131 Other than the proceeds 
obtained, the POCA cannot be used to deal with activities related to rhino 
poaching outside the Republic.  
3.2.2 Modes of criminal liability as an alternative? 
While the POCA sought to amend particular acts, these amendments have 
suffered practical limitations in enforcing the criminal liability of all the key 
players in rhino poaching.132 There are various principles of criminal law in 
relation to modes of liability such as aiding and abetting, conspiracy to 
commit an offence, common purpose and accessorial liability which need to 
be interrogated.133 It is argued that unless these principles are developed to 
have extraterritorial application, they cannot be applied to rhino poaching or 
wildlife offences in general. To substantiate this, the author interrogates the 
use of common purpose in prosecuting the higher echelons. 
In South Africa persons may be taken to participate in the commission of an 
offence where it is shown that they formed a purpose to commit the offence, 
directly or indirectly. According to the common purpose doctrine, the 
prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that each accused had 
the requisite intention with respect to the unlawful outcome at the time of 
the commission of the offence.134 This is an indication that the higher 
echelon should have intended the criminal act of poaching the rhino as the 
                                            
131  Chapters 5 and 6 of POCA. 
132  The Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 and ICCMA. 
133  Such principles have been used in the POCA, but the defining feature is that the 
culprits are arrested within the bound of South Africa's jurisdiction. For aiding and 
abetting under the POCA, see De Vries v The State 2012 1 SACR 186 (SCA). 
Burchell Principles of Criminal Law Section G. 
134  Dewnath v S 2014 ZASCA 57 (17 April 2014) para 12. 
RD NANIMA  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  23 
intended criminal result of their facilitation of the process through the 
provision of logistics for this purpose. This position rhymes with the 
definition that where "two or more persons agree to commit a crime or 
actively associate in a joint unlawful enterprise, each will be responsible for 
specific criminal conduct committed by one of their number which falls within 
their common design."135 
One may ask the question, what informs the common purpose. This is pretty 
straight forward - a prior express or implied agreement before the 
commission of the offence.136 The limits of its application are in relation to 
extraterritoriality, where an individual participates in a location where the 
court does not have jurisdiction. While the common purpose doctrine would 
be instructive, its extraterritorial application is limited. A good example is 
where a person commits the offence of theft outside South Africa and then 
maintains the possession of the property herein.137 The lack of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the wording affects the use of common purpose 
in prosecuting higher echelons. This is exacerbated by the limited nature of 
the extraterritorial jurisdiction that is provided for under the POCA.138 As 
such, the doctrine of common purpose can be used only where the penal 
laws of the States that harbour higher echelons enable the prosecution of 
offences where their participation starts in another jurisdiction (like South 
Africa) and continues to that jurisdiction (like Vietnam).139  
Furthermore, the challenge to combatting rhino poaching lies in its nature 
as a transnational other than an international crime. The prosecution of the 
higher echelons in an international crime is accomplished by the use of 
universal jurisdiction, regardless of where the criminals are located.140 
Conversely, the prosecution of transnational crime requires interstate 
cooperation.141 The existence of limited cooperation affects the already 
                                            
135  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 467. 
136  S v Mgedezi 1989 1 SA 687 (A) 705-706. 
137  In S v Kruger 1989 1 SA 785 (A) the court held where in terms of South African law, 
one commits theft in a foreign country, one could be tried in South Africa because of 
the continued act of appropriation, with the necessary intent, in South Africa. See 
Mujuzi 2015 AYIHL generally. Other laws that have similar provisions that allow the 
prosecution of acts committed in other countries, that may ably use the common 
purpose principle include Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act 32 of 2007 s 61; the Nuclear Energy Act 32 of 1998 s 56A; 
Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act 7 of 2013 s 12. 
138  See discussion following section 3.2.1 above. 
139  Mujuzi 2015 AYIHL generally. 
140  Boister 2003 EJIL 953-976; Boister Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law 
generally. 
141  Boister 2003 EJIL 953. 
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limited extraterritorial jurisdiction.142 Furthermore, where there are limited 
interstate transnational values, the emphasis attached to the prosecution of 
rhino poaching is not the same in other States.143 
3.2.3 Use of the aut dedere aut judicare principle: an alternative? 
Another possible alternative is the use of the aut dedere aut judicare 
doctrine. Although this principle is used by the International Criminal Court 
in the context of war crimes, it is instructive in contextualising the need for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.144 This principle requires that a State with the 
custody of an international offender has a duty to either prosecute or to 
extradite him or her to another State to face trial. This principle draws 
legitimacy from international treaties that are signed to secure the 
prosecution of war crimes145 and crimes against humanity.146  
It should be noted that the principle may be applied outside the scope of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes on the basis of the relationship 
between the principle of aut dedere aut judicare and human rights. First, the 
enforcement of human rights requires that the protection of the impugned 
rights be subjected to the prosecution of perpetrators.147 Secondly, where 
national crimes attract a level of international concern, the obligation to use 
the principle should suffice.148 In this regard, where the crime that is 
transnational in nature affects the social, economic, cultural and other 
interests of all or a substantial number of States and involves private 
individuals or group conduct, the aut dedere aut judicare principle may be 
                                            
142  Boister 2003 EJIL 953. 
143  Boister 2003 EJIL 953. See Emslie et al 2016 
http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/pdf_files/147/1470753643.pdf 6. 
144  Ferreira et al 2017 UFRGSMUN 213-215. 
145  These refer to serious infringements of customary or treaty rules of international 
humanitarian law protecting important values occasioned during internal and 
international armed conflicts. See Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), 
IT-94-1-A (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) (15 July 1999). 
146  These crimes are serious attacks on human dignity, grave humiliation as part of a 
widespread or systematic practice of committing atrocities which are tolerated by 
government policy or are part of a large attack on civilians or persons not involved 
in the hostilities or enemy combatants both in times of war and peace. Cassese 
International Criminal Law. 
147  Ferreira et al 2017 UFRGSMUN 214. 
148  Boister 2003 EJIL 966. See Art 3 of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime (2000), which refers to such crime as being 
"transnational in nature": where the crime is "(a) committed in more than one State; 
(b) it is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, 
direction or control takes place in another State; (c) it is committed in one State but 
involves an organised criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than 
one State; or (d) it is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another 
State". 
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used.149 In this regard, the international criminalisation of poaching in 
endangered species by CITES should be viewed as an international 
concern with rhino poaching as a national crime.150 
One may argue that the challenges to the application of the principle in the 
national sphere lie in a State's discretion to balance its sovereignty on the 
one hand and extradition on the other;151 or where its punishment for the 
criminal conduct amounts to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment.152 These challenges are solved by the level of international 
concern that the crime attracts.153 The South African Constitutional Court 
has pronounced its support for the non-imposition of punishments that 
amounts to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.154 The issue 
of the severity of the punishment in the context of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, therefore, does not arise. 
Despite the likelihood of overcoming the challenges to the application of the 
aut dedere aut judicare principle, South Africa's position in the fight against 
rhino poaching needs to be contextualised. Where the higher echelon is in 
a country other than South Africa, his or her successful prosecution lies with 
the prosecutorial authorities in that State. South Africa cannot seek to 
prosecute the perpetrator beyond its borders. Prosecution can take place 
only where the interests of South Africa and the other State converge. In 
addition, at its core this principle requires that the State in control of the 
person to be investigated surrenders or delivers him or her to be prosecuted 
in the State seeking extradition. This requirement should be in its domestic 
law or in an international treaty to which both the requesting State and the 
State in custody of the perpetrator are parties.155  
                                            
149  Some of the crimes that have been recognised by the United Nations include drug 
trafficking, corruption, and the financing of terrorism. See Panov Obligation aut 
Dedere aut Judicare 99. 
150  See the discussion under section 3.3 below. 
151  Kemp 2003 SACJ 373. 
152  Chitat Ng v Canada Communication No 469/1991 para 10.5. Also see Safeguards 
Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty ECOSOC 
Res 1984/50 (1984). 
153  See the preceding paragraph. 
154  Mohamed v President of the Republic of South Africa 2001 3 SA 893 (CC) paras 61-
67. 
155  For instance, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance (2006) expressly provides in Art 11 that: "The State Party 
in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed an 
offence of enforced disappearance is found shall, if it does not extradite that person 
or surrender him or her to another State in accordance with its international 
obligations or surrender him or her to an international criminal tribunal whose 
jurisdiction it has recognised, submit the case to its competent authorities for the 
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Some scholars argue that this obligation does not necessarily refer to 
investigations. It is suggested that investigations should be done where 
there is adequate evidence to prosecute the offence before it can be 
prosecuted in the State where the accused is located. Where the offence in 
the State that is holding the higher echelon is radically different, it is 
necessary to extradite the person to the other State, where he or she will be 
prosecuted.156 This brings one back to the position that the lack of an 
extradition agreement on rhino poaching with either Mozambique or 
Vietnam negates the chances of the possible prosecution of an accused in 
South Africa. 
The lack of treaties that codify the criminalisation of particular conduct  
denies the State in need of this treaty the legal effect of such codification, 
and as such there is no binding engagement with the State that harbours 
the perpetrators.157 It is rather unfortunate that while the origin of a 
transnational criminal law norm is international, its penal proscription is 
limited to national jurisdiction, making its application an uphill task.158 
3.3 Steps by CITES 
Recent decisions taken at the 17 Conference of the Parties to the CITES 
are important to this conversation. They offer guidance to States Parties, 
the CITES Secretariat, range Parties, Mozambique and Vietnam.159 The 
Secretariat requires all parties to review their implementation and strategies 
related to the effectiveness of the law-enforcement response to rhino 
poaching and trafficking.160 While this is a welcome development, it requires 
a concerted effort to have the effects of the review felt across the board. 
This is especially true where the level of emphasis on a particular wildlife 
species in one State is not commensurate to the level of emphasis in others. 
Secondly, all rhino range States have a duty to always review poaching and 
trafficking trends, such that the preventive and combating measures are 
                                            
purpose of prosecution". Therefore, where Mozambique or Vietnam does not have 
a similar position in their laws, it can neither prosecute nor extradite. The author is 
not aware of any law in South Africa, Vietnam or Mozambique that provides for the 
application of the aut dedere aut judicare principle.  
156  Henzelin Le Principe de l'Universalité en Droit Pénal International generally. 
157  Panov Obligation aut Dedere aut Judicare 98. 
158  Boister 2003 EJIL 953. 
159  CITES 2017 https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/69/E-SC69-60.pdf / 
https://cites.org/eng/com/sc/69/index.php. 
160  CITES 2017 https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/69/E-SC69-60.pdf / 
https://cites.org/eng/com/sc/69/index.php paras 1 (a)-(b). Minutes of the 69th 
meeting of the Standing Committee in Geneva (Switzerland), 27 November – 1 
December 2017, SC69 Doc 60, Decision 17.133. 
RD NANIMA  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  27 
effective, adaptive and responsive to new trends. 161 This speaks to the need 
for vigilance in prosecution,162 mutual cooperation and enforcement through 
various measures such as extradition,163 and the use of strategies that 
counter the killing and trafficking of rhinos.164 The duties placed on range 
States reflect the key concepts informing this contribution, namely effective 
prosecution, mutual cooperation and extradition. These duties require that 
the range States either prosecute the higher echelons on the basis of their 
violations of South Africa's environmental penal law, or extradite the 
offenders to the Republic. Secondly, they ought as far as possible to attach 
the same emphasis that South Africa and the States Parties to CITES attach 
to the prohibition of rhino poaching. This is evident in the Secretariat's duty 
to conduct visits to Mozambique and Vietnam to review arrests, seizures, 
prosecutions, and convictions.165 This approach suggests the need to 
appreciate the socioeconomic constructions that the two countries attach to 
rhino horn. While the Mozambican perpetrators benefit financially from 
illegal transportation, Vietnamese society believes in the medicinal benefits 
that rhino horn accords it. This has to be contextualised in the move to 
ensure effective prosecution, mutual cooperation, and extradition. These 
steps have shown that the question of the effectiveness of the current legal 
regimes of the States Parties to ensure that a higher echelon resident in a 
range State can be tried is lacking. 
4 Use of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
In view of the challenges described above as being evident in the operation 
of the POCA with regard to the prosecution of culprits with regard to 
endangered species, it is prudent to contextualise extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and indicate how it may be used.166 This is premised on the fact that China, 
                                            
161  CITES 2017 https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/69/E-SC69-60.pdf / 
https://cites.org/eng/com/sc/69/index.php paras 2(c), (d), and (e)(i)-(iii). Minutes of 
the 69th meeting of the Standing Committee in Geneva (Switzerland), 27 November 
– 1 December 2017, SC69 Doc 60, Decision 17.134. 
162  CITES 2017 https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/69/E-SC69-60.pdf / 
https://cites.org/eng/com/sc/69/index.php para 2(c). 
163  CITES 2017 https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/69/E-SC69-60.pdf / 
https://cites.org/eng/com/sc/69/index.php para 2(d). 
164  CITES 2017 https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/69/E-SC69-60.pdf / 
https://cites.org/eng/com/sc/69/index.php paras 2(e)(i)-(iii). 
165  CITES 2017 https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/69/E-SC69-60.pdf / 
https://cites.org/eng/com/sc/69/index.php, Standing Committee in Geneva 
(Switzerland), 27 November – 1 December 2017, SC69 Doc 60, Decisions 17.137, 
17.138, and 17.139. 
166  See the critique of POCA in section 3.2 above. 
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Vietnam, Mozambique and South Africa are all signatories to CITES.167 In 
addition, there is an MoU between South Africa and Vietnam where the two 
countries identify illegal wildlife trafficking as a global challenge that requires 
cooperation in the enforcement of and in compliance with CITES.168 Other 
than agreeing on the need for compliance with CITES, the two countries do 
not agree on the prosecution of cases beyond their borders.169 It is important 
to note that the forms of cooperation do not specifically include the 
prosecution of persons engaged at the three levels of rhino horn poaching 
as indicated above.170 It should be noted, however, that the two States 
agree that other forms of co-operation may be mutually agreed upon by 
them, subject to their domestic legislation. The relevant Article provides for 
other forms of cooperation as shall be mutually agreed upon by the Parties 
subject to the Parties domestic legislation and available funding.171 While 
this provision is a welcome development, it poses two challenges. First, it 
does not specifically speak to wildlife offences like rhino horn poaching. 
Secondly, the author is not aware of any provision in the POCA that may be 
used to prosecute such individuals under this MoU.172 On a lighter note, the 
decisions by the CITES Conference of Parties and the recent adoption of 
new environmental penal laws in Vietnam are steps in the right direction. 
This aids the pursuit of logical avenues to prosecute trafficking in rhino horn 
as a challenging transnational crime. 
There is a need to pursue the possible prosecution of all the players in the 
rhino horn syndicates. There are examples of States that have used 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to deal with instances of environmental crime. For 
instance, the United States (US) Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 provided 
                                            
167  South Africa ratified the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973) (CITES) on 15 July 1975, entered into force 13 
October 1975. Mozambique acceded to it on 25 March 1981, entered into force on 
23 June 1981, while Vietnam acceded to the same on 20 January 1994, entered into 
force 20 April 1994 (CITES 2019 https://cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php). 
168  Preambular paras 4-7 of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the 
Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa on Cooperation on Biodiversity Conservation and Protection 
(2012). 
169  Articles 2(a)-(g) of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the 
Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa on Cooperation on Biodiversity Conservation and Protection 
(2012). 
170  The contents of the MoUs inadvertently fail to link the three levels in rhino poaching 
with the need to find ways of combating the vice through the execution of these 
agreements  
171  Article 3(e) of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government 
of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa on Cooperation on Biodiversity Conservation and Protection (2012). 
172  See the critique of POCA in section 3.2 above. 
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for measures that made it unlawful to import, export, sell, acquire, or 
purchase fish, wildlife or plants taken, possessed or sold in violation of a 
State or foreign law.173 Thus, it provided for extra-territorial action. Instead 
of creating an offence to violate US national law elsewhere, the Act 
prohibited the violation of the laws elsewhere, to be prosecuted in the US.174 
In addition, in March 1998 Norway required all Norwegian registered 
companies or vessels conducting business outside its territorial waters to 
register for a period of one year.175 In the event that a vessel was removed 
from the register for the contravention of conservation or management 
measures laid down by regional or sub-regional agreements, it lost access 
to all quotas it stood to benefit from in the domestic and cooperative 
fisheries.176  
These historical successes indicate that South Africa and the range states 
can use extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute offenders who are arrested 
outside its jurisdiction. An arrangement on extraterritorial jurisdiction that 
goes beyond recovering the proceeds of organised crime is instructive. In 
addition, to effectively utilise extraterritorial jurisdiction, one has to establish 
the nature thereof that is needed by South Africa to ensure that there is 
optimal prosecution of the higher echelons of those involved in rhino 
poaching. The question is how this extraterritorial jurisdiction may be 
applied. The answer lies in a brief unpacking of the concept of 
jurisprudence. Jurisdiction may be of a prescriptive, adjudicative or 
enforcement nature.177 With regard to the enquiry being undertaken in this 
article, adjudicative jurisdiction is instructive insofar as it involves the power 
to subject persons or things to a judicial process.178 In this regard, there is 
a need to subject the higher echelons of those involved in rhino poaching to 
                                            
173  Hayman and Brack 2002 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/crime/pdf/env_ 
crime_workshop.pdf. 
174  Hayman and Brack 2002 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/crime/pdf/env_ 
crime_workshop.pdf. 
175 Hayman and Brack 2002 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/crime/pdf/env_ 
crime_workshop.pdf. 
176  Hayman and Brack 2002 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/crime/pdf/ 
env_crime_workshop.pdf. 
177  For an extensive discussion on jurisdiction, see Colangelo 2014 Cornell L Rev 1311; 
Podgor 2002 Ga.J Int'l & Comp L 5-9; Curley and Stanley 2016 Bond L Rev 169-197 
from the perspective of offences against children. 
178  Hartford Fire Ins Co v California 509 US 764 (1993) 813; National Commissioner of 
the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre 
2015 1 SA 315 (CC) paras 26-28. Some international law scholars suggest that 
adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction can be read together; O'Keefe 2004 JICJ 
735-737; and Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 301. 
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prosecution both in respect of their personal involvement and/or the rhino 
horn as the subject of their activities.  
In addition to the above, with regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
international law has developed principles on territoriality. First, any one 
State may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State, 
unless there is a rule making that possible; and secondly, States have a 
wide discretion to exercise jurisdiction within their own territory in instances 
where there are acts or omissions that have been committed outside their 
borders.179 With regard to the first principle, the then Permanent Court of 
International Justice stated: 
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a 
State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary – it may 
not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense 
jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its 
territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom 
or from a convention.180 
This indicates that in international law the existence of a permissive rule 
allows a State to exercise its jurisdiction over an act that occurs in another 
State. The question that follows with regard to the scope of the permissive 
rule is whether a State's enforcement of jurisdiction in respect of acts 
committed in another State is based on the existence of the permissive rule 
or the lack of a prohibitive rule. This question resonates with the 
presumption that what is not prohibited under international law is 
permitted.181 It follows that there is a lack of clarity with regard to the 
application of the permissive rule due to changing strands of either 
sovereignty or interdependence. While it may be argued that the SS Lotus 
case of France v Turkey (the Lotus case) postulates a position that 
international law is either a system of permissive or prohibitive rules,182 this 
conclusion does not reflect the majority opinion, leading to the development 
of the Lotus principle. The majority opinion presented States as independent 
communities that need to ensure co-existence by recognising equal 
sovereignty as the basis for any restriction on the exercise of their 
sovereignty.183 As a result, the principle that permissiveness should be 
based on a State's discretion to consent to an act of extraterritorial 
                                            
179  The case of the SS Lotus (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ Series A, No 10 (hereafter 
the Lotus case) 18-19. 
180  The Lotus case para 45. 
181  Hertogen 2015 EJIL 902; Roth 2004 Fla L Rev 1029; Weil 1998 Colum J Transnat'l 
L 112; Handeyside 2007-2008 Mich J Int'l L 72. 
182  Hertogen 2015 EJIL 904. 
183  The Lotus case para 18; Lowe and Staker "Jurisdiction" 319-320; Ferreira-Snyman 
2006 Fundamina 17-18; Perrez Cooperative Sovereignty 395. 
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jurisdiction in exercise of its sovereignty indubitably has to be linked to its 
interdependence.184 Therefore, international law is not a system of 
permissive or prohibitive rules as the Lotus principle suggests, but rather a 
collection of independent States that co-exist.185 It follows that this co-
existence assists in the balancing of rights and interests between States in 
the sphere of international law.  
The application of extraterritorial sovereignty by South Africa with regard to 
acts committed by the higher echelons of those involved in organised crime 
should not be seen as an act that undermines the sovereignty of other 
States, such as Mozambique and Vietnam, but rather as an act that requires 
the interdependence of sovereign States affected by rhino poaching. There 
is a lot of scholarly literature that calls for co-existence and interdependence 
in fighting environmental crime, which is instructive in creating a basis for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to fight it.186 
In addition to the discussion on the permissive rule, consider this 
hypothetical situation that illuminates the concept of extraterritoriality. 
Poacher A poaches rhino horn and transmits it to a receiver B. This receiver 
then transports the horn beyond South Africa's jurisdiction to an 
international receiver C. The international receiver transmits the rhino to a 
kingpin D, who then uses the distributor E to transfer the product to the 
consumer F. This hypothetical scenario indicates that while poacher A and 
the receiver B are within South Africa's borders, the international receiver 
C, distributor E and consumer F are beyond South Africa's borders. A 
localisation of a particular transaction informs the choice of jurisdiction. If 
one places emphasis on where the transaction started, then A and B are 
prosecuted in South Africa due to South Africa’s prescriptive jurisdiction as 
a result of its national laws.187 With regard to the transaction that forms the 
effect of the crime, that is the transmission of the rhino horn to the persons 
C, D or the distribution to E and F, their prosecution may be undertaken in 
the respective countries without any need for extraterritorial jurisdiction.188 
The question that needs to be answered is why C and D should not be 
prosecuted in the Republic.  
                                            
184  Hertogen 2015 EJIL 4. 
185  This is based on the fact that while States elect to be bound by signing international 
treaties, the use of generally accepted principles to regulate relations among States, 
indicates that some restrictions balance the sovereignty and co-existence of States. 
186  See the discussion at notes 182 to 183 above. 
187  Colangelo 2014 Cornell L Rev 1313. 
188  Colangelo 2014 Cornell L Rev 1313. 
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Before one engages with the possible prosecution of C and D in the 
Republic, this hypothetical situation poses a plethora of challenges. First, 
other countries may not criminalise the conduct of C and D. For instance, 
Mozambique and Vietnam do not have laws that deal with Organised Crime 
Groups with regard to international receivers, kingpins and distributors of 
rhino horn.189 However, Vietnam's Penal Code provides for offences against 
regulations on the management and protection of endangered and rare 
animals within its jurisdiction. The Section states: 
1. Any person who violates regulations on management and protection of 
animals on the List of endangered and rare species; endangered, rare animals 
of Group IB or in Appendix I of CITES in any of the following cases shall be 
liable to a fine of from VND 500,000,000 to VND 2,000,000,000 or face a 
penalty of 01 -05 [sic] years' imprisonment: 
a)  Illegally hunting, killing, imparking, [sic] transporting, trading animals on 
the List of endangered and rare species; 
b)  Illegally storing, transporting, trading animals specified in Point a of this 
Clause or body parts thereof; from 02 kg to under 20 kg of elephant 
tusks; from 0.05 kg to under 01 kg of rhino horns.190 
The section is silent on dealings in an endangered animal or animal 
products from outside the country's jurisdiction. One may argue that the 
problem that South Africa is dealing with in regard to the higher echelons of 
those involved in such conduct is not adequately dealt with under Vietnam's 
Penal Code either. 
Secondly, and as noted earlier, the States in issue may not attach similar 
emphasis to rhino horn poaching as South Africa does. While South Africa 
has taken various initiatives to curb rhino poaching, such as the 
establishment of an environmental investigative task force, the monitoring 
of rhino populations, the prosecution of alleged offenders, and the forfeiture 
of assets that arise from the trade, other countries have not taken such 
initiatives.191 In this regard, a look at Mozambique's position on 
environmental crime is instructive due to the challenges that arise from its 
                                            
189  Mozambique's Conservation Law 16 of 2014 does not provide for the prosecution of 
higher operatives in the business of rhino horn poaching. The author is not aware of 
any legislation in Mozambique or Vietnam that deals with the prosecution of 
international receivers or kingpins. Vietnam was in the process of revising its penal 
code to enhance the penalties for wildlife crime and improve the prosecution of 




190  Sections 244(1)(a)-(b) of the Vietnam Penal Code Law No 100/2015/QH13. 
191  See section 1.3 above. 
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limited initiatives in comparison with South Africa. Mozambique's 
Conservation Law provides for a maximum prison sentence of 12 years for 
poaching protected species.192 However, this harsher sentence does not 
appear to apply to wildlife trafficking cases. In addition, the Conservation 
Law does not define the protected species.193 Research indicates that the 
limitations implicit in these initiatives have dire effects on dealing with rhino 
horn poaching. While 539 alleged poachers were arrested between 2012–
2014, the convictions led to the imposition of 17 fines and no custodial 
sentences.194 While a Report by the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Rhino Specialist Groups and Trade Records 
Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce (TRAFFIC) to CITES' 17th 
Conference of the Parties (CoP17) showed that high-ranking law 
enforcement officers were arrested for armed robbery and trafficking in rhino 
horn, they were released on bail.195 In addition, a Vietnamese citizen who 
had initially been arrested at Maputo Airport going to Kenya with seven rhino 
horns in May 2012 was later detected a week later at Bangkok's 
international airport in transit from Kenya to Hanoi with the horns.196 As a 
result, the different initiatives in Mozambique, Vietnam and South Africa 
justify the need for the Republic's adoption of another approach in the 
direction of extraterritorial jurisdiction. South Africa has to engage other 
countries through the strategic use of extraterritorial jurisdiction to deal with 
the international receivers, kingpins and distributors. 
As such, a treaty or extradition arrangement offers the platform of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to deal with rhino poaching. At their core is the 
prosecution in South African courts of the higher echelons arrested in the 
range States. This would aid the effective use of modes of criminal liability 
such as common purpose. The use of extraterritorial jurisdiction embraces 
the definition of poaching and poachers by the NISCWT with regard to the 
individuals who are involved in the collection, transportation and distribution 
of rhino horn. It offers an opportunity to enhance the second and third 
objectives of the NISCWT, which require that a lot of the prevention and 
promotion be done outside the borders of South Africa. 
                                            
192  Article 55(b) and 62 of the Conservation Law 16 of 2014 (the Portuguese version is 
authentic and the author obtained an English version for purposes of this study). 
193  See the glossary of terms in the Conservation Law 16 of 2014. 
194  EIA 2014 https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/eia_iwtp-report-
mozambique.pdf. 
195  Emslie et al 2016 http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/pdf_files 
/147/1470753643.pdf 6. 
196  Emslie et al 2016 http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/pdf_files/ 
147/1470753643.pdf 6. 
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5 Conclusion and recommendations 
An evaluation of the current legislation shows that all the provisions deal 
with the prosecution of rhino poachers who are inside South Africa. This 
conclusion is buttressed by the evaluation of the use of common purpose 
as a mode of criminal liability, which still requires the accused to be within 
South Africa for it to be effected. Furthermore, other principles like the use 
of aut dedere aut judicare are not effective in so far as they are not 
entrenched in the legislation that provides for offences that aid rhino 
poaching. It seems clear that there is a need for ad hoc arrangements or 
other modes of mutual assistance to ensure that the accused is either 
brought to South Africa for prosecution or tried in the range States for his 
role in the poaching. 
In addition, the recent recommendation by the DEA on compliance and the 
enforcement of wildlife offences still falls short of leading to the effective 
prosecution of higher echelons.197 As stated earlier, the addition of offences 
in the POCA to schedule 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act simply makes the 
trial process more effective with regard to the accused who are in South 
Africa.198 The higher echelons are still effectively not prosecuted due to a 
lack of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
The achievement of logical solutions to rhino horn poaching has to take 
place through the use of both long-term and short-term engagements that 
speak to the prosecution of all the players in the poaching nexus. The first 
logical step is to use the multinational or bilateral treaties that provide for 
judicial or quasi-judicial jurisdiction. In this context it is desirable that any 
MoU clearly provides for the investigation and prosecution of the players in 
the rhino horn nexus from the first to the second and third hierarchies. While 
the bilateral agreement may be achieved through MoUs, extradition treaties, 
or further engagements with CITES, a provision that provides for the 
prosecution of the higher echelons of those involved in rhino poaching for 
their involvement per se rather than for their use the proceeds of their crimes 
is the preferred and most effective course of action to pursue. 
In addition, the establishment of ad hoc extradition arrangements between 
South Africa and other affected countries should be encouraged through the 
diplomatic channels to enable the prosecution of the higher echelons. This 
                                            
197  This is true where higher echelons do not feature in the ongoing prosecutions of 
rhino poachers. There is emphasis on the prosecution of the persons who are 
arrested while poaching. 
198  Section 3.2.1 on the evaluation of the POCA. 
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will create subsidiary universality, which will enable the prosecution of these 
people once they are apprehended in territories other than South Africa.199 
The existence of these treaties is affected by their failure to deal with the 
prosecution of the higher echelons of rhino poaching. This failure highlights 
the need to have this law. Therefore, an amendment to the POCA that 
provides for the domestication of the multilateral or bilateral treaties should 
be adopted to ensure that extraterritorial jurisdiction is achieved. This will 
ensure their prosecution, which will be fortified by the treaties that allow for 
the extraterritorial jurisdiction. A few initiatives need to be undertaken in 
order to make it possible to deal with the limitations on the POCA through 
the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction. First, the offences related to 
racketeering activities and the proceeds from illegal activities should be 
extended beyond their current application to the benefits that accrue from 
illegal activities and their use to advance illegal activities to the actual illegal 
activities that involve players beyond South Africa's borders. This would 
enable the prosecution of the international players in the rhino poaching 
syndicates where the State can prove that a person has transported or 
distributed endangered species or their products, like rhino horn. In addition, 
there should be an extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction for offences with 
regard to the proceeds obtained and the subsequent application of 
appropriate orders to deal with them to enable the Republic to deal with the 
offences themselves rather than with the proceeds obtained from the 
offences.200 The activities (that do not include the application of the 
proceeds of rhino poaching) of the higher rhino poaching echelons outside 
South Africa that emerge from the rhino poaching within the Republic would 
then be adequately dealt with in the POCA. These activities would include 
the transportation, processing and distribution of rhino horn products. Thus, 
the activities of the higher echelons that are not expressly subjected to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as the transportation and distribution of 
rhino horn, would be provided for. It is thus proposed that the South African 
Law Commission should undertake a due diligence study of chapters 5 and 
6 of the POCA with a view to the provision of extraterritorial jurisdiction for 
the prosecution of the higher echelons of those involved in rhino horn 
poaching. 
The argument that an amendment to the POCA is flawed. First, the current 
provisions deal only with the proceeds arising from the crimes instead of 
with the crimes themselves, which limits the application of the POCA. As a 
                                            
199  Boister 2003 EJIL 964. 
200  Chapters 5 and 6 of POCA. 
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tool, the POCA will be better utilised when the amendment is introduced. 
The cost of the investigation would greatly be reduced if there were 
cooperation with other investigative agencies, including sharing evidence 
and information on the activities that arise from the action of rhino poaching 
in the Republic.201 In addition, though there are clear instances of political 
will in Vietnam and South Africa, as shown in the recently signed MoU to 
cooperate in criminal matters, and to control the sale of the rhino horn in the 
two countries; a lot more needs to be done.202 This is also evident in the 
recent step taken by Vietnam to join other countries in signing the London 
Declaration on the illegal wildlife trade and the introduction of a penal law 
that prohibits the poaching of the rhino horn.203 This gesture of political will 
would be self-defeating if Vietnam were not to take practical steps to 
prosecute these echelons or enter ad hoc engagements to extradite the 
perpetrators to South Africa to face trial.204  
The long-term strategies include engaging with CITES and INTERPOL to 
remind State Parties to perform their obligations under the treaties, and 
should be adequately expressed in any extradition treaties or MoUs 
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